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4 5	Attorney for the Labor Commissioner
6	BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
7	OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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10	KEITH BROCK,) Case No. TAC 03-01)
11	vs. Petitioner,) DETERMINATION OF
12) CONTROVERSY)
13	MARIO and KAREN TAMBELLINI,) individually and dba ENTERTAINMENT)
14	CONSULTANTS, ,)
15	Respondent.
16)
17	INTRODUCTION
18	The above-captioned petition was filed on January 30,
19	2001, by KEITH BROCK, (hereinafter "Brock" or "Petitioner"),
20	alleging that MARIO and KAREN TAMBELLINI dba ENTERTAINMENT
21	CONSULTANTS, (hereinafter "EC" or "Respondents"), acted in the
22 23	capacity of a talent agency without possessing the required
	California talent agency license pursuant to Labor Code §1700.5 ¹ .
	The petitioner seeks from the Labor Commissioner a determination
26	voiding the parties' 1995, representation agreement <i>ab initio</i> and requests disgorgement of all commissions paid to respondent
27	requests disgorgement of all commissions para to respondent
28	¹ All statutory citations will refer to the California Labor Code unless otherwise specified.

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stemming from this agreement. Additionally the petitioner seeks an order enjoining the respondent from further distribution of a marketing video containing petitioner's name and likeness. The respondent did not file an answer.

5 A hearing was scheduled before the undersigned attorney, 6 specially designated by the Labor Commissioner to hear this matter. 7 The hearing commenced on August 24, 2001, at the Orange County 8 office of the Labor Commissioner. Petitioner was represented by 9 Nancy R. Tragarz of Prenovost, Normandin, Bergh & Dawe; respondent 10 appeared through his attorney Stuart L. Wallach. Due consideration having been given to the testimony, documentary evidence and 11 arguments presented, the Labor Commissioner adopts the following 12 determination of controversy. 13

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FINDINGS OF FACT

Petitioner is a guitar player who performs both in 1. 16 a band and as a solo act. Additionally, the petitioner is a 17 storyteller, and disc jockey who is hired primarily to perform his 18 various talents at wedding receptions. In 1995, the petitioner 19 entered into an exclusive representation agreement with the 20 respondent, whereby the respondent would "represent said artist in 21 all branches of the entertainment field". The representation 22 agreement maintained that, "in the event that the Artist's 23 [petitioner's] personal services are booked for a customer by Agent 24 [respondent], the Artist agrees that Agent shall receive a fee or 25 commission for each job secured or negotiated by Agent." 26

2. The respondent owns a wedding consulting business designed to provide a "one-stop" alternative to couples with

1 nuptials on the horizon. The respondent testified that he could 2 not only provide the entertainment for the event, but also furnish 3 limousines, tuxedos and the photographer and/or videographer.

4 3. For several years the relationship progressed very 5 smoothly and eventually the petitioner became the respondent's most 6 consistently engaged entertainer. The respondent offered credible 7 evidence that the petitioner performed often utilizing all aspects 8 of his aforementioned talents. In fact, the relationship initially 9 proved to be so mutually beneficial that Brock and EC partnered in 10 the creation of a one-hour marketing video designed to showcase both the services offered by the respondent and the talents of the 11 petitioner. 12

The video was widely distributed at local bridal 4. 13 If an interested third party contacted the respondent for shops. 14 information, the respondent would discuss the possible booking with 15 the petitioner and ask him how much he needed to earn for that 16 particular engagement. The respondent would then use that figure 17 to negotiate the price for services with the third party. In most 18 cases, the respondent would double Brock's price when submitting 19 the bid to the third party. If the entertainment was booked, the 20 respondent would keep 50% for himself and remit the remaining 50% 21 to the petitioner. 22

5. In 2000, the parties had a falling out and according to the petitioner, Brock discovered that the respondent was not a licensed talent agent and as a result seeks to void the contract between them and requests disgorgement of all commissions paid to the respondent during the length of the relationship. The respondent alleges that the Talent Agencies Act should be narrowly

1 construed and therefore the petitioner who acts primarily as a D.J.
2 whereby "no particular talent is required" is not the type of
3 artist contemplated by the legislature.

⁴ 6. Additionally, the respondent claims that the Talent
⁵ Agencies Act's statute of limitations precludes any monetary
⁶ recovery for any violation that occurred before one year prior to
⁷ the filing of the petition.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

10 It is without question that as a guitar player and 1. 11 leader of a performing band, the petitioner is an "artist" within 12 the meaning of Labor Code §1700.4(b). Respondent's argument that the Talent Agencies Act should be narrowly construed is severely 13 misplaced. The Act is a remedial statute ... [and is] designed to 14 correct abuses that have long been recognized and which have been 15 the subject of both legislative action and judicial decision . 16 Such statutes are enacted for the protection of those seeking 17 employment [i.e., the artists]. Consequently, the Act should be 18 liberally construed to promote the general object sought to be 19 accomplished. To ensure the personal, professional, and financial 20 welfare of artists. <u>Waisbren v. Peppercorn</u>, 41 Cal.App.4th 246 at 21 254. The Talent Agencies Act was created to correct abuses that 22 occur to all artists, especially the fledgling artist. It is the 23 struggling artist who does not possess a team of professionals 24 maximize the artist's profits. Moreover, seeking to the 25 respondent's argument that the majority of time the petitioner 26 performs as a wedding disk jockey, and therefore, his status as an 27 artist should be based upon his primary activity, is also

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¹ incorrect. The percentage of time in which the petitioner performs ² as a wedding D.J. in ratio to his performances as a guitar player ³ or band leader is insignificant. He is a guitar player and leader ⁴ of a band and conducts these activities consistently for the ⁵ respondent. Consequently, the petitioner is an artist within the ⁶ meaning of Labor Code §1700.4(b).

7 2. The only remaining issue is whether based on the 8 evidence presented at this hearing, did the respondent operate as 9 a "talent agency" within the meaning of Labor Code §1700.40(a)? 10 And if so, are there any applicable defenses afforded the 11 respondent?

12 3. Labor Code §1700.40(a) defines "talent agency" as, "a person or corporation who engages in the occupation of 13 procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment 14 or engagements for an artist or artists." In <u>Waisbren v.</u> 15 Peppercorn Production, Inc (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 246, the court 16 held that any single act of procuring employment subjects the agent 17 to the Talent Agencies Act's licensing requirement, thereby 18 upholding the Labor Commissioner's long standing interpretation 19 that a license is required for any procurement activities, no 20 matter how incidental such activities are to the agent's business 21 as a whole. 22

4. Again, respondent contends that his primary duty was to book the petitioner as a D.J. and not as a guitar player and therefore the Act should not apply. This primary duties test is inapplicable to the analysis. <u>Waisbren</u>, supra., rejects the idea that incidental procurement is not covered by the Act and maintains that this view "[does] not consider the remedial purpose of the

1 Act, the decisions of the Labor Commissioner, or the Legislature's 2 adoption of the view (as expressed in the California Entertainment 3 Commission's Report) that a license is necessary for incidental 4 procurement activities." Waisbren, supra, at 261. As a result, 5 the Labor Commissioner continues to follow Waisbren and the long-6 standing policy that even incidental procurement of employment as 7 an artist requires a license. Applying <u>Waisbren</u>, it is clear 8 respondent acted in the capacity of a talent agency within the 9 meaning of Labor Code §1700.4(a).

10 5. Labor Code section 1700.5 provides that "no person 11 shall engage in or carry on the occupation of a talent agency 12 without first procuring a license therefor from the Labor 13 Commissioner." It was stipulated the respondent did not possess a 14 talent agency license during the course of the relationship.

Finally, respondent argues that the petitioner 15 6. mistakenly seeks affirmative relief, in the form of a request for 16 disgorgement of all commissions paid to the respondent throughout 17 the relationship. Respondent contends that a request for damages 18 beyond the one-year statute of limitations found at Labor Code 19 section 1700.44(c) is counter to the express language of the Act. 20 The statute provides that "[n]o action or proceeding shall be 21 brought pursuant to [the Talent Agencies Act] with respect to any 22 violation which is alleged to have occurred more than one year 23 commencement of this action proceeding." prior to the or 24 Respondent contends that any violations occurring prior to January 25 30, 2000 are not recoverable. He is correct. Disgorgement is 26 limited to the commissions paid during the one-year prior to the 27 filing of the action with the Labor Commissioner. 28

1 7. Finally, in Buchwald v. Superior Court (1967) 254 2 Cal.App.2d 347, 351, the court held that because "the clear object 3 of the Act is to prevent improper persons from becoming [talent 4 agents] and to regulate such activity for the protection of the 5 public, a contract between an unlicenced [agent] and an artist is 6 void." Consequently, the resulting contract which often 7 represented a 50/50 split of the profits between the parties is 8 unconscionable and void ab initio.

ORDER

For the above-stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 1995 contract and accompanying "Agreement Not to Compete" between petitioner KEITH BROCK and respondents, MARIO and KAREN TAMBELLINI as individuals and dba ENTERTAINMENT CONSULTANTS is unlawful and void *ab initio*. Respondents have no enforceable rights under that contract.

Having made a clear showing that the respondents 17 collected \$24,319.00 in commissions within the one-year statute of 18 limitations prescribed by Labor Code §1700.44(c), petitioner is 19 entitled to a monetary recovery. Respondents shall disgorge to the 20 petition \$24,319.00 in illegally received commissions within 30 21 from receipt of this Determination of Controversy. days 22 Petitioner's request for injunctive relief is denied as the Labor 23 Commissioner is without authority to award injunctive relief. 24

IT IS SO ORDERED

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· 3 Dated: December 17, 2001 DAVID L. GURLEY Attorney for the Labor Commissioner ADOPTED AS THE DETERMINATION OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER: Dated: December 17, 2001 ARTHUR S. LUJAN State Labor Commissioner